What are the implications
of certain forms of migration
and mobility being criminalised in the
context of the Middle East and North Africa
Introduction.
The European
Union’s Schengen Agreement[1]
on open borders has externalised its border controls to the Middle East and
North Africa. Italy has, with perseverance, pursued hard-line bilateral
agreements with Libya, implementing heavily armed border guards to patrol its
waters. In doing so, certain Italian
political parties such as the Lega del Nord[2]
(Northern League) have coerced the general public into believing that irregular
migrants arriving from the MENA region are criminals. One implication of this apparent criminalisation has been to
enable Italy to ‘repatriate’ migrants to Libya without the ability to claim
asylum protection. Many migrants, once returned to Libya, suffer intense human
right abuses as Libya begins to adopt the E.Us far-right rhetoric against
immigration. Furthermore, with the
tightening of European border controls human smuggling and trafficking
industries have been left as one of the few viable routes into Europe. In turn,
this has tended migration as a whole to be seen as a criminal activity.
The first
section of this paper will introduce a synopsis of the migration patterns,
routes and historical background in migratory relations between the Middle East
North Africa (MENA) and Southern Europe. The second part will examine and
clarify the different interpretations between aspects of irregular migration. A
distinction between human trafficking and human smuggling will be produced
discussing how the international community has approached these diverse yet
inter-related practices. To provide a case-study the third part of the essay
will offer an examination into how Italian has politically criminalised
irregular migrants and what effect these policies have had on the media and the
general public. The fourth section will investigate how Italy (and European)
policies and attitudes towards irregular migration have led to an increase in
human trafficking and smuggling and human rights abuse in Libya. The paper will
conclude by examining how due to the E.U’s and Italy’s restrictive border
controls, migrants and the practice of migration, has come to be conceived as a
criminal act.
History &
Routes.
The end of World
War II, and the rise of European labour immigration from the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) in the 1960s, along with the economic expansion and
subsequent oil-crisis in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries[3],
migration established as a continuous contemporary phenomenon in the MENA.
However, the foundations of present MENA immigration to Italy were set in stone
soon after the independence of transit countries[4]
such as Algeria, Morocco and Libya.
Following the
UN’s 1992-2000 embargo, Libya pursued ‘pan-African’ policies. These strategies
not only welcomed large numbers of labour migrants but also allowed Libya to
strengthen political ties with many neighbouring African countries. During the
1980’s many migrants from West Africa and Central Africa fled to Libya escaping
drought, civil war and growing wide spread political instabilities. During the
1990’s Libya, with these new ‘pan-African’ immigration policies, witnessed an intensification
of regular and irregular migration. By 1995, according to Bredeloup & Pliez
(2006) 90% of Libya’s sub-Saharan population originated from Sudan, Chad and
Niger.
As Libya’s
population rapidly grew, Italy, which prior to 1991 had relatively lax
immigration laws with small penalties for irregular immigrants, soon became a
destination for MENA originating migrants. The popularity of Italy was “not
only due to its exposed geographical location, but also the needs of the
economy and the governmental policy. Labour-intensive underground industries
rely extensively on immigrant labour, whose wages are very low by European
standard” (Vayrynen,2003:14). This
permitted Italy to sustain its large informal sector with cheap labour,
allowing the black market to grow in 1998 to 28.0% of its gross domestic
product (GDP)[5]
(Bovi,2002:20)[6], [Figures
2].
Post 1991 Italy
introduced visa requirements for Maghrebi migrants ending free seasonal and
circular migration from the MENA. Subsequently, Libya not only intensified as
migratory destination in its own right[7]
but also became fertile ground for smuggling and trafficking industries to
establish. By 2004 up to 80% of irregular migrants to the E.U, following the
‘North African Route’ departed from the Libyan ports of Zuwarah and Zilten,
disembarking on the Sicilian island of Lampedusa (Baldwin-Edwards,2005:18),
(Sorensen, 2006:55). In 2006, Zuwarah acted
as the main point of departure for smuggling networks operating in Libya
[Figure 1+2]. Libya is now considered the main transit country in North Africa
with its authorities estimating “that currently [2006] the foreign population
residing in Libya is 600,000, and that a further 750,000 to 1.2 million are
residing illegally” (Sorensen, 2006:27).
Map 1: Transit Migration
Routes from Africa (MENA) to Europe.
(ICMPD,2004 – sourced: Baldwin-Edwards,2005:18)
Map 2: Irregular Migration
Routes from Libya to Italy.
(Sorensen, 2006:55)
Definitions
of Irregular Migration
This essay,
while focusing on irregular migration, will not artificially dissociate the
process of human smuggling from that of human trafficking, primarily because as
the second section will explore, both practices are known to be reciprocally
interrelated. It is essential to note the subtle differences between smuggling
and trafficking, to what extent their interactions have affected the
international community’s response in categorising the two processes, and how
their relationship plays a key role in the criminalising of migrants both in
the political and societal sphere.
The criminal
and/or exploitative acts associated to smuggling and trafficking are generally
considered interchangeable, whilst the manner in which the two processes
unravel can be distinctly different. “Human trafficking is considered the
transportation of people from one place to another for exploitative purposes
through coercion, deception, or some other form of illicit influence, while
human smuggling is associated more with illegal border crossing under the
assistance of third parties”(Icduygu & Toktas, 2002:28). Smuggling implies a voluntarily purchase of illegal
services to evade international border controls. Arab states play various and
multiple roles on migration routes. They act both as destination, transit and recruitment points for the
traffickers, smugglers and smuggled or trafficked individuals. (Arab Human
Development Report, 2009: 8).
Trafficking and
smuggling challenge traditional migration theories. “They blur the boundaries
between forced and voluntary movements and between legality and illegality”
(Salt,2000:35). Consequently human
trafficking and human smuggling, although possessing separate UN Protocols[8]
are considered to be part of the UN Convention on Trans-national Organized
Crime (UN,2004:41,53). Primarily
this is associated with the fact that unlike many other migratory patterns
trafficking and smuggling are covert activities.
Data collection
on both activities has predominantly been sporadic rather than systematic.
“From a methodological standpoint, one of the most persistently difficult
problems in this field is the measurement and analysis of determinants of
unauthorized immigration. The illegal flow of persons across national borders
wreaks havoc with national population statistics”(Portes & DeWind
2007:11-13).
States have
therefore developed diverse definitions for smuggling and trafficking.
Effectively, different interpretations play a key role in data collection
methods and policy implementations. Hence the implications of whom is a victim
or perpetrator has become a major factor[9].
The practice of criminalising human smuggling in comparison to human
trafficking, is a “process leading a person or group of people to be the
object, first, of repressive action by the police forces, an then to undergo
judicial proceedings”(Palidda,2009:11).
Human trafficking on the other hand, is criminalised as a process of irregular
migration, defined as “crossing borders without proper authority, or violating
conditions for entering another country” (Jordan&Duvell,2002:15).
Although
smuggling and trafficking share common aspect of being irregular migratory
paths, they are diverse patterns of migration. States have repeatedly coupled
the two processes whilst predominantly disregarding their differentiation. In
portraying smuggling and trafficking as the same process, public opinion of
irregular migration as whole is misinterpreted. The role played by language in
creating power relations and social and political identities is key in
understanding the process by which migrants have been criminalised[10].
The common portrayal of irregular migrants as desperate and impoverished
has led to distorted media images and exaggerated policy discourses overstating
the magnitude of irregular migration from Africa (de Haas, 2008:49).
Italy’s Political Criminalisation of Migrants.
Drawing on Europe’s (specifically Italy’s) migration policies post-fall
of the Berlin Wall (November 1989) we note that Europe has become increasingly
more determined to restrict migrants originating from the MENA. European
migration policies changed towards accepting labour migrants from the Eastern
Europe rather than from the MENA.
“It was from the start of the 1990s that
European police forces ended up adopting racial profiling as an instrument of customary repression and control
and the selection of immigrants, informal but nonetheless effective, was primed
to favour people coming from eastern countries…In countries of long-standing
immigration, criminalisation increasingly took on racist features” (Palidda,2009:11).
The second report by the European Commission Against Racism and
Intolerance, heavily criticised Italy’s “diffuse employment of racist and
xenophobic propaganda from certain exponents of Italian political parties. Such
propaganda is focused on non-EU migrants and on those that lack legal status” (ECRI,2002:25-sourced
Paoletti,2009:10). The report argued that Italian political
debates were responsible for associating migration with drug trafficking and
prostitution, further marginalising and criminalising MENA migrants.
Disembarkation of migrants on the island Lampedusa enabled Italian
politicians to describe it as an “assault” or an “invasion”[11]. Analogies of migration bordering on the
edge of legality have been reoccurring themes of the recent Italian politics,
with Berlusconi stating in 2010:
“Una riduzione degli extracomunitari
significa meno forze che vanno ad ingrossare le schiere delle criminalità”[12]
(Repubblica,29 gennaio 2010).
Furthermore Roberto Maroni, a leading member of the Lega del Nord
(Northern League) and minister of Labour and Welfare during Berlusconi’s
second and third governments from 2001 until May 2006,
stated:
“Il mio compito…è sostenere una linea molto vigorosa sulla
sicurezza, tenendo conto anche dei contributi critici che stanno arrivando in
questi giorni. Il principio è garantire la massima sicurezza ai cittadini,
prevenire e combattere in modo rigoroso l'immigrazione clandestina e affermare
il principio di legalità”[13] (Ministro dell’interno, 2008)
These political statements criminalising migrants depict not only
negative connotations but are also hard to sustain when it is observed that
“from 1990 to 2009, the total number of crimes has decreased, while immigrants
(both regular and irregular) have increased by 420%”(Palidda,2009:174). [Figure 3].
Figure 3:Registered crimes 1990-2008
(Palidda,2009:174)
The Implications Amplified by the Media.
The catalyzing of the
‘assault’ of migrants on Italian shores is further articulated when it is noted
that Italy, unlike many other European countries, is ‘privileged’ with a
particularly tight relationship between state and media[14].
“Italy’s heady blend of politics and media has made headlines inside and
outside the country, with watchdogs…pointing to Prime Minister Berlusconi's
influence over both public and private broadcasting…Italy's TV market…are a
potentially powerful political tool” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1065345.stm#media).
Italian media outlets are heavily drawn to populist tones, discussing
immigration in a ”thematic spectrum that fits into the frames of invasion
(arrivals in boats, overcrowding of detention centres, expulsion orders), of
Islamic terrorism…and, with a typically Italian doggedness, into that of
security (a more suggestive way of calling the obsession for the criminal
activity of immigrants, that may include anything, regardless of whether it
involves criminal offences or not: from violence to dealing, from murder to
prostitution, from cowboy drivers to sellers of counterfeit goods) (Maneri,2009:29). It is therefore unsurprising that generally a crime reporter discusses
immigration issues, swaying the overall public to consider “migration as a
social threat” (Paoletti,2009:9).
The correlation between xenophobia, media and the evolution of
criminalising migrants has not only been particular to Italy, but also to
Europe as a whole. In 2006 the Report on Racism and Xenophobia presented by the
Fundamental Rights Agency to the Civil Liberties Committee claimed that racism
still remained “a serious social ill across Europe” European Union Agency
for Fundamental Rights, 2007).
Human Rights Implications
If we pass from the political and media dialogue that has led to a
criminalisation of immigrants to considering the effects, we note that the
European response has been to “send them back” (Baldwin-Edwards,
312:2006). Italy (like many other E.U.
states) seems to ignore, that as IOM (International Organisation for Migration)
spokesman Flavio Di Giacomo expressed, “if all migrants just stopped working
now, the Italian economic system would collapse”(Itano,20:2010).
Nevertheless,
Italy has independently pursued bilateral agreements with Libya, whereby
migrants are instantly deported (‘repatriation flights’) when caught by the
authorities, disregarding their human and asylum rights. “In October 2004 Italy
returned 1,000 people, without allowing them to claim asylum, to Libya…this
meant that effectively the migrants were denied the right to asylum even though
they had arrived in an EU country[15]”(Baldwin-Edwards,
320:2006). Furthermore, in July 2009 the
Italian government amended the 1998 Unified Text on Immigration. The revision
of Article 6 introduced a one-year imprisonment and a fine of up to 2,000 Euros
to an irregular in Italy (Parlamento Italiano2009:4).
The expulsion of migrants to transit countries such as Libya has led the
Italian government to “be criticized by, among other organizations, the
European Parliament, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch and the UNHCR” (Paoletti,2009:16).
‘Repatriation flights’ potentially entail grave human right abuses,
especially when considering that Libya does not recognise the Geneva Convention
(view footnote 15), nor the OAU asylum procedures[16].
Many migrants suffer detention for indefinite periods as well as sometimes
being submitted to forms of slavery[17].
It has also been observed, with growing evidence, that Libya after receiving
the ‘collective repatriations’ by the Italian authorities deport (along with
other migrants it has apprehended) and abandon them in the middle of the desert[18],
leaving few able to survive[19]
(Vassallo Paleologo, 2009:232), (Baldwin-Edwards 2006), (Del Grande, 2007).
In December 2007, Italy and Libya signed an agreement on the joint
patrolling of coasts, ports and bays, “Italy committed itself to providing six
patrol boats to Libya, and in January 2008 the Italian Parliament approved the
allocation of over €6 million for the Guardia di Finanzia”[20] (Paoletti,
2009:15). Italy has pursued these bilateral agreements
with the conviction that they will tackle the core issues regarding the
‘invasion’ of Lampedusa, as Roberto Maroni stated in 2008:
“potremo dire addio una volta per tutte al problema
degli sbarchi a Lampedusa”.
Libya’s echo
of Italy’s Policies.
Ironically, the
implications of these hard-line approaches taken by Italy and Libya have been
one of the fundamental reasons why migrants are engaging in illegal smuggling
and trafficking. “While smuggling is commonly represented as one of the main
‘causes’ of irregular migration, it is rather the result of increasingly
restrictive migration policies” (de Haas, 2008:49). In turn this has
allowed for bureaucratic institutions to easily criminalise migrants and in
doing so violate their human rights (Soresen, 2008:122).
The ability of
Libya to manage these variant aspects of migration has now become central.
Particularly when considering that Libya, apart from being a migratory
destination in its own right as well as a transit country, now deals with the
treatment of the irregular, returned, asylum seeking and refugee migrants that
Italy has mishandled, criminalised and deported. With the E.U. externalising
asylum and immigration policies to Libya through proposals, such as that of
Franco Frattini’s (European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security) “to
move aero-naval patrols into Libyan waters from 2008 onwards” (Del Grande,
2007:3), Libya has come to express
sentiments of being ‘bottle-necked’[21]
with migrants, whereby they not only police their own borders but also those of
Europe.
“The Europeans want us to be their police along their borders” (Paoletti,2009:17).
Indeed, Libya
has come to echo concerns on immigration similar to those of Italy. As the
Libyan Foreign Minister, Rahman Shalgham stated, “If for you Italians, illegal
immigration is a problem, for us it’s much more – it’s an invasion” (Paoletti,2009:6).
As the European
Community has criminalised migrants and ‘collectively repatriated’ them to the
MENA, the major implication has been that Libya has come to consider migration
(much like Europe) as a security issue, specifically in five areas:
unemployment, national identity, spread of new diseases, education standards
and criminality.
Firstly,
unemployment, according to the IMF “may be as high as 30 percent remain[ing]
one of Libya’s greatest problems”(Vandewalle,2006:188). In relation to national identity it has been stated
that,
“There are some villages in the South and
in the desert that are undergoing a process of ‘Africanisation’. In these parts
of the country, the African outnumber the Libyans. This clearly raises some
questions concerning integration and national identity” (Paoletti,2009:8).
Thirdly, the
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has come to
suggest that migrants are responsible for the spread of HIV and other diseases
that did not previously exist in Libya. In regards to education, the rise in
migration is blamed as a root cause for not achieving previous successes in
education. Libya claims that due to the depletion of resource it’s been unable
to uphold its high universal enrolment in primary education and the 14%
illiteracy rate, which is below the regional average of 34%. (World Bank, 2006:7). Nonetheless, as Paoletti (2009:9) notes,
“this information has neither been confirmed nor disproved by other sources”
due to the absence of comprehensive data on education standards.
Furthermore,
migration is treated as a security issue because of its alleged links to the
rise in crimes and terrorism. Much like Europe, Libya in supporting the increased immigration controls for the E.U. borders has taken full
advantage of the concerns about terrorism generated by 9/11[22].
For as the Paoletti report demonstrates from several interviews with Libyan
Professors:
“60% or 50% of migrants are Muslim and
many come from countries where there are extremist organisations”…“Migrants
represent a link with the foreign community and terrorist organizations. The
link has been proved” (Paoletti,2009:8).
Conclusion
Human right abuses and criminalisation acts against migrants in countries
such as Libya are effectively legitimized by Italy’s far-right policies. The
Italian government in implementing extreme border controls, whilst dispersing
media coverage referring to migrants as social burdens, alleged or proven
criminals, or even affiliates of terrorism has effectively constructed negative
public perception of “clandestines”. As long as the E.U. continues to
criminalise migrants and diverse migration patterns, immigration will not be
recognised as “intimately connected with the transformation of the world
economy” (Vayrynen,2003:1).
Fundamentally the implication of criminalising migrants is that
migration itself has come to be conceived as a dangerous and criminal route out
of poverty. The marginalisation of migrants promotes the undertaking of illegal
migratory routes such as smuggling and trafficking, all of which further
encourage and guarantee the abuse of human rights and the underdevelopment of
the MENA region (Baldwin-Edwards,2006:314).
In conclusion with countries such as Libya increasingly acting as an
extension of the E.U’s borders, the negative European rhetoric towards migrants
and migration has grown. Leaving Libya eagerly to adopt and amplify “its
concerns on immigration in way that resembles the European far right security
paradigm” (Paoletti,2009:20).
Bibliography
-Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2006) ‘”Between a rock
and a hard place”: North Africa as a region of emigration, immigration and
transit migration.’ Review of African Political Economy, 33, 311-324.
-Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2005) Migration in the
Middle East and Mediterranean, A paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and
Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration.
Panteion University Athens, Greece.
-Bhabha, J. & Zard, M. (2006).
Smuggled or Trafficked? Forced Migration Review, number 25.
-Bovi, M. (2002). The Nature of
the Underground Economy. Some Evidence From OECD Countries, ISAE Istituto di Studi e Analisi
Economica. Rome
-Bredeloup, S. et Pliez, O.
(2006) Migration entre les deux rives du Sahara. Migrations Societe, Vol 18;
Numb 107, pages 265-266.
-de Haas .H (2008). Irregular
Migration from West Africa to the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends.
IOM Migration Research Series, No. 32,
Geneva. P14.
-Demir, J. S. (2003a) The
trafficking of women for sexual exploitation: a gender-based and well-founded
fear of persecution? Geneva: UNHCR.
-Duvell, f. (2006).
Crossing the fringes of Europe: Transit migration in the EU’s neighbourhood. Centre
on Migration, Policy and Society, University
of Oxford, Oxford.
-Edwards, A. (2008). Traffic
in Human Beings: At the Intersection of Criminal Justice, Human Rights,
Asylum/Migration and Labor.
-European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights, (2007) Report on Racism and Xenophobia in the EU Member
States.
-Del Grande, G. (2007) Fortress
Europe, Escape from Tripoli, Report on the conditions of migrants in transit in
Libya. Rome
-İcduygu, A. and Toktas, S. (2002) ‘How do
smuggling and trafficking operate via irregular border crossings in the Middle
East?’ International Migration, 40/6, pp. 25-54.
-Itano, N. (2010) Southern Europe’s Immigration
Test. Time magazine March, 01, 2010.
-Jordan, B. and Duvell, F. (2002)
Irregular Migration: The Dilemmas of Transnational Mobility, Edwards Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK.
-Maneri, M. (2009) Media and the
war on immigration. Criminalisation and Victimisation of Migrants in Europe, Work Package 3 Criminalisation
and Decriminalisation Process, Crimprev, Assessing Deviance, Crime and
Prevention in Europe, Dipartimento di Scienze Antropologiche, Unversita degli
Studi di Genova.
- D. Melossi, ed., Symposium on
Migration, punishment and social control in Europe, «Punishment and
Society», 4/2003, 371-462 ; Palidda S., 2008, Mobilità umane. Introduzione
alla sociologia delle migrazioni, Milan, Raffaelo Cortina; E. Guild, Les étrangers
en Europe, victimes collatérales de la guerre contre le terrorisme, in D. Bigo, L.
Bonelli, T. Deltombe, dir., Au nom du 11 septembre. Les démocraties à
l’épreuve du terrorisme, Paris, La Découverte; 2008, pp. 139-150
-O.A.U, (10th
September 1969), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa. Refugee Convention.
-Palidda, (2009) Introduction Criminalisation and Victimisation of Migrants in
Europe, Work
Package 3 Criminalisation and Decriminalisation Process, Crimprev, Assessing
Deviance, Crime and Prevention in Europe, Dipartimento di Scienze Antropologiche,
Unversita degli Studi di Genova.
-Paoletti, E. (2009) The Case of
Italy, Libya and the EU,RAMSES Working Paper 12/09 April 2009, European Studies
Centre, University of Oxford.
-Portes, A. & deWind, J
(2007) “A Cross-Atlantic Dialogue: the Process of Research and Theory in the
Study of International Migration.” In PORTES, A. and DE WIND, J. (Eds.) Rethinking
Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Oxford, New York: Berghahn Books.
-Salt, J. (2000) ‘Perspectives on
the trafficking of migrants’. International Migration, 38 (3): 31-56.
-Sciortino, G. & Colombo, A.,
(2004), Gli Immigrati in Italia, Bologna: Il Mulino.
-Schneider ,S. (2002). Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110
Countries Around the World. Workshop of Australian National Tax Centre, ANU,
Canberra, Australia.
-Segretaria Organizzativa
Federale (2000), Cronistoria Della Lega Nord Dalle Origini ad Oggi, Quinta
Parte 2000.
-Sorensen, N. (2006) Mediterranean
Transit Migration, Danish Institute for International Stidoes, Copenhagen.
-United Nations (2000) Protocol
Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the
United Nations Convention Against Transnationalism. General Assembly resolution 54/212 of 22 December 1999.
-United
Nations (2000) Protocol to the Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, The Trafficking Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, United Nations, General Assembly, 11th Session,
adopted by Resolution 55/25, signed 12-15 December 2000, Palermo
-UN, (2004). United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols Thereto.
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Vienna.
-United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for
Arab States. Arab Human Development Report, (2009). Challenges to Human
Security in the Arab Countries. New York.
- UNHCR. (1st
September 2007), Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
UNHCR Media Relation and Public Information Service, http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf
-Wolrd Bank, (2006) Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya Country Economic Report, Report
No. 0295-LY.
-Vandewalle, D. (2006) A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-Vassallo Paleologo, F. (2009) Lampedusa, Europe’s
Guantanamo?
The practice of prohibitionism
of migrations and violation of fundamental rights at the Sicilian border, (Università di Palermo),
Criminalisation and Victimisation of Migrants in Europe, Work Package 3
Criminalisation and Decriminalisation Process, Crimprev, Assessing Deviance,
Crime and Prevention in Europe, Dipartimento di Scienze Antropologiche,
Unversita degli Studi di Genova.
-Vayrynen, R. (2003) Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking,
and Organized Crime. Discussion Paper No. 2003/72. United Nations University.
WIDER World Institute for Development Economics Research.
Internet resources:
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/servizi/legislazione/immigrazione/legislazione_200.html
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/
[1]
“The Schengen area and cooperation are founded
on the Schengen Agreement of 1985. The Schengen area represents a territory
where the free movement of persons is guaranteed. The signatory states to the
agreement have abolished all internal borders in lieu of a single external
border. Here common rules and procedures are applied with regard to visas for
short stays, asylum requests and border controls. Simultaneously, to guarantee
security within the Schengen area, cooperation and coordination between police
services and judicial authorities have been stepped up. Schengen cooperation
has been incorporated into the European Union (EU) legal framework by the
Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997” (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.htm).
[2] The Northern League can be compared to the British BNP
and the France’s Front National. The Northern League holds 8.1% of the Italian
government and 25 seats, making it the third strongest party in the country. (http://electionresources.org/it/senate.php?election=2008).
[3] The Cooperation Council for
the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is a regional organisation
consisting of six Gulf countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and United Arab Emirates. The GCC was created in May 1981. Its main objectives
are to enhance coordination, integration and inter-connection among its Member
States in different spheres. During the past decades the countries of the
Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) have witnessed an
unprecedented economic and social transformation. Oil proceeds have been used
to modernize infrastructure, create employment, and improve social indicators,
while the countries have been able to accumulate official reserves, maintain
relatively low external debt, and remain important donors to poor countries.
All the GCC member states are members of the Arab
League and Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
are the prominent members of OPEC. (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/gulf_cooperation/index_en.htm), (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/fasano/index.htm),
See: http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/index.php
[4]
Transit countries are countries whereby transit
migration is undertaken by people entering a national territory who may stay
for a period of weeks or months whilst gathering funds and organising the next
part of the migratory trip. It is the process by which a migrant will enter a
country but leave following a certain amount of time to an onward destination.
See:
-Duvell, f. (2006). Crossing the fringes of Europe: Transit migration
in the EU’s neighbourhood. Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford, Oxford.
-de Haas .H (2008). Irregular Migration from West Africa to the
European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends. IOM Migration Research Series,
No. 32, Geneva. P14.
[5]
For more info see: Schneider ,S. (2002). Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110
Countries Around the World. Workshop of Australian National Tax Centre, ANU,
Canberra, Australia
[6] More info view tables on page 20 and 21.
[7]
See Bawldwin-Edwards, M. (2006) ‘”Between a rock
and a hard place”: North Africa as a region of emigration, immigration and
transit migration.’ Review of African Political Economy, 33, p313 for
discussion on how Libya, apart from being a transit country has been a
migratory destination of its own. Primarily owing to its development of oil and
a high per capita GDP, with an estimated 1.1-1.4 million up to 1.8
million, of which 600,000 are legal workers, with a population recorded around
5.5m, immigration ratio to population in the order of 25-30%. With E.U border
controls tightening Libya migratory role intensified.
[8]
The trafficking and smuggling of human beings
has been a focus for the International Community for over a century. In 2000
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children (2000 TP) (UN,2000: 3, art. 3) further expanded the scope of previous International
conventions on human trafficking (1904 and subsequent 1910, International
Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, the 1949 Convention
of the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others…etc) to include “a range of non-prostitution-related
trafficking offences, such as trafficking for forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude and removal of organs” (Edwards,2008:14). Following the 2000 TP and in recognition of the
subtle logistical and legal differences, along with the prevailing conviction
that “smuggled adult migrants are male, while trafficked adult migrants are
female”(Demir,2003:7) the UN
acknowledged that the act of human smuggling demanded a separate protocol. In
the year 2000, soon after signing the 2000 TP, the 2000 Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air was adopted (UN,2000,art.2,
art.3,3).
[9] For as Bhabha & Zard (2006) stated, “there is much
to be gained from being classified as trafficked, and much to lose from being
considered smuggled” (Bhabha & Zard, 2006:7).
[10] For further discourse on an analysis of how language
shows uses techniques and institutions, developed for different and often quite
innocuous purposes, converged to create the modern system of disciplinary
power.
See Foucault: (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/).
[11]
The use of words such ‘assault’ and ‘invasion’
have been a rhetoric repeatedly used by far-right Italian political parties
such as the Lega del Nord (Northern League) (view footnote 12), to emphasise
and stress, with sinister undertones, that migrants arriving in Sicily is the
equivalent to and invasion/assault on Italy;
“Da sempre la Lega è contro l’invasione dei clandestini che scardinano
l’identità della nostra società: le identità culturali e quella religiosa,
quella cattolica. Siamo contrari all’intera catena di montaggio che prima
attira e facilita l’ingresso dei clandestini e poi attraverso le sanatorie li
regolarizza”.
Transalation: “The
Northern League has always been against the invasion of clandestines, who
destroy our national identity: our cultural and religious identity, the
catholic one. We are against the whole system that first attracts and
facilitates the entry of clandestines” (Lega del Nord, 2000:40).
[12] Translation “a reduction of immigrants means a
reduction of criminals”.
[13] Translation: “My task is to promote a vigorous line in
terms of security…The principle is to guarantee maximum security for the
citizens and the prevent as well as fight in a rigorous manner clandestine
immigration and to assert the principle of legality”
[14] The interaction between politics, migration and the
media is a well-researched phenomenon of Italy, see: Sciortino,
G. & Colombo, A., (2004), Gli Immigrati in Italia,
Bologna: Il Mulino
[15] Under the UNHCR 1951 convention, of which Italy is a
signatory, any person with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion” is allowed to claim
asylum protection under “the so-called principle of non-refoulement, i.e. that no Contracting State shall expel or return
(“refouler”) a refugee, against
his or her will…to a territory where he or she fears persecution” (UNHCR,2007:16,5). In so, Italy in implementing ‘repatriation flights’
has been criticised of subordinating the 1951 convention.
-O.A.U, (10th September 1969), Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Refugee Convention.
-http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions.
[17] Case-studies producing evidence of forms of forced
Labour: (Del Grande, 2007:22)
1) Kamal, Morocco
“We had suffered a
shipwreck off the Libyan coast. They rescued and then took us to prison in al
Fellah, in Tripoli. Every day, they brought us to do some forced labour. If you
told the police officers that you didn’t know how to do a job, they would beat
you. And if you complained that you were tired, the same would happen. They
didn’t care if the only thing we got to eat was a fistful of rice and a
baguette”.
2) Ayman, Tunisia
“Every day, from
al Fellah, a team of around twenty people left to do forced labour in the
mountain, in the fields”.
[18] Case-studies evidencing migrants being deported and
abandon in desert: (Del Grande, 2007:25)
1) Fabrice, Togo
“From Qatrun, they
loaded us into a lorry and abandoned us on the border with Niger, at the height
of Toumou. We had to walk for three days, under the sun, to reach Madama, in
Niger”.
2) Elvis, Cameroon
“They deported us
all, from Qatrun to Toumou, on the border with Niger. Toumou is an oasis where
Libyan border soldiers live. They had abandoned us there, under the sun, two
days’ walk away from Qatrun, and just as many from Madama, across the border in
Niger. We used the glare of the lights of the oasis at night to find our way.
In September 2007, there were 150 migrants living in Toumou who are completely
blocked, without any money to continue the journey, some of whom have gone mad.
The smugglers who were returning from Libya gave us a lift towards Dirkou. But
then they unloaded us two days’ walk away from Dirkou. And once we finally
arrived in Dirkou, the Niger policemen refused to receive us. They recovered
the corpses of two travel companions of ours who had died under the sun, and
then loaded us onto an off-road vehicle to take us back to Toumou. The Libyan
police took us 25 back to Qatrun. Two weeks later, a Nigerian friend who I met
in prison again bribed a guard and they freed us once more”.
3) Yakob, Ethiopia
“They leave for
the desert and, half-way there, they ask you for money to go back. I met a
youth in Zuwarah who had spent six months in Kufrah and was then deported. They
were fifty in the lorry. Half-way there, the driver asked them to pay three
hundred dollars each. Only thirty of them had the money. They went back with
them. The other twenty were ditched in the desert. They will have died under
the sun, surely. They even take money that you don’t have from you. If, for
example, you don’t have any money on you, but you have a relative in Europe who
is able to pay, before abandoning you on the border, they lend you their
satellite mobile phone to call and ask them for a Western Union money
order”.
[19]
A further issue regarding, is that when
repatriated, human trafficking victims are, with growing evidence filtered back
into trafficking rings, such as the case in Eastern Europe documented by Demir
(2003), (Demir,2003:12).
[20]
Guardia di Finanza is a special force affiliated
to the Police force and dependent on the Ministry of Economy and Finance. It is
organised and integrated by the Armed Forces (Forze Armate dello Stato) and the
Public Forces (Forze Pubblica) (http://www.gdf.it/Organizzazione/Chi_siamo/I_Compiti_del_Corpo/index.html). -
[21] “Libya is one of the countries that have been severely
affected by migration. It has depleted our resources. We have twice or three
times as many people as our own in Libya. We feed them, house them, provide
them with transportation, and they take their share of all the cheap products
subsidized by the Libyan budget” –Al Qaddafi, 2006 (Paoletti,2009:6)
[22]
“Criminalisation of migrants has been
further strengthened at a European level since the start of the 2000s, in the
context of the «war against terrorism» after the attacks of 11 September 2001” (Molessi,
2008)
No comments:
Post a Comment